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recommendation is to be found in the joint consultation 
document.
It gives me great pleasure to announce that it is 
envisaged that a follow-up conference will be arranged by 
the Centre for Corporate Law and Practice under the 
auspices of the two Law Commissions during the second 
half of the year, on a second joint consultation paper 
eagerly awaited by especially every venture capitalist in the 
UK, dealing with the review of the Limited Partnership Act 
1907. There are also a number of 'firsts' for this 
conference, which I am glad to be allowed to mention. 
This is the first conference arranged by the Centre for 
Corporate Law and practice under my directorship, the 
first conference by the Centre dealing exclusively with the 
law of partnership, and the first conference offered by the 
Centre under the joint auspices of both Law Commissions
(as far as I know, it is also the first conference in which 
Law Commissioners from both countries are 
participating).
Last but not least, this is the first conference in the 
United Kingdom on the joint consultation paper and, I am 
sure, the fist conference on partnership law in the United 
Kingdom ever to be so well attended. The IALS is very 
grateful to the two Law Commissions, and Judge Diana 
Faber, for their support and encouragement. @
Professor Johan Henning
Director, Centre for Corporate Law and Practice, Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies; Dean, Faculty of Law, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein
The impact of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 on evidence 




As public awareness of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) 
develops it is likely to have a significant impact on the 
volume and nature of judicial review proceedings. The 
new grounds provided by the HRA for challenging the 
actions of public authorities will inevitably lead to changes 
in the way the Administrative Court deals with such cases. 
As the Bowman Report (Review of the Crown Office List, 
chaired by Sir Jeffery Bowman, March 2000), noted:
'... under the Human Rights Act, the courts will have to 
spend more time establishing questions offact in addition to 
questions of law. For example, in deciding whether interference 
with a right can be justified, they may need to give stricter 
scrutiny to the factual basis of the decision or consider the wider 
social context. In the past, very little time has been taken on 
factual matters and discovery and cross examinations have been 
rare.' (Chap. 5, para. 8)
The most noticeable changes in judicial review 
proceedings are likely to be in relation to:
  the evidence considered by the court, and
  the growing need for the court to order disclosure.
As the Bowman Report states, 'further evidence may be 
necessary under the Human Rights Act.'(Chap. 5, para. 
70), and 'orders for discovery [as it was then known] may 
well be required more frequentlv in the future, 
particularly in relation to Human Rights Act cases.' (Chap. 
5, para. 69)
Neither the Civil Procedure Rules nor the HRA provide 
detailed guidance on how judicial review proceedings 
need to be adapted to cope with this change. The 
European Convention on Human Rights is equally silent 
on the issue - evidence and disclosure merely being a facet 
of the Article 6 right to a fair trial - and the jurisprudence 27
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of the European Court of Human Rights ('the Strasbourg 
Court') provides little assistance.
In Schenk v Switzerland ((1991) 13 EHRR 242), the 
Strasbourg Court held:
'While Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a 
Jair trial it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of 
evidence as such, which is therefore primarily a matter Jbr 
regulation under national law.'
The issue of procedure was briefly considered by the 
Strasbourg Court in Kaufman v Belgium (an Article 6 fair 
trial case relating to prosecution disclosure in criminal 
proceedings) which held that:
'Everyone who is a party to... proceedings should have a 
reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to the court under 
conditions which do not place him at a substantial disadvantage 
vis a vis his opponent.' ((1986) 50 DR 98)
This lack of formal rules or guidance will enable 
advocates to persuade the domestic courts to be innovative 
in admitting evidence and ordering disclosure in the 
interests of giving proper effect to Convention rights. In 
order to do so they will need to have a clear understanding 
of the nature and effect of the Convention rights, how they 
will alter the issues which the court must address in 
judicial review proceedings and the manner in which that 
must be done.
THE NATURE OF CONVENTION RIGHTS
Judicial review proceedings which rely upon the HRA 
will not allege that a public authority has acted wrongly or 
perversely but simply that it has acted in a manner which 
is contrary to a Convention right. Consequently, the 
nature of those rights will have a direct bearing on the 
evidence which a court will need to consider in such 
proceedings.
Whilst a small number of Convention rights are absolute 
(e.g. the Article 2 prohibition of torture inhuman or 
degrading treatment) most are subject to certain 
limitations or qualifications which are expressed in 
broadly similar terms. Thus, Article 8, para. 2, permits 
interference with the right to respect for private and 
family life to the extent that such interference is:
(1) in accordance with the law; and
(2) is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
one of a specified list of public policy objectives (e.g. 
national security).
The issue of whether limitation of a Convention right is 
prescribed by law has been interpreted narrowly by the 
Strasbourg Court to mean that an ascertainable legal 
regime must exist and that administrative notices, 
guidance, etc., do not amount to prescription by law. For 
example, InMalone v UK (1984) 7 EHRR 14, interception 
of communications on the basis of guidance issued by the 
Association of Chief Police Officers was held to be
unlawful. That case led to the passing of the Interception of 
Communications Act 1985. The UK Government has 
recognised that generally some form of legislation is 
necessary to meet the 'prescribed by law' test and it seems 
likely that the domestic courts will adopt that view.
Notions of what is 'necessary in a democratic society' 
present much more difficulty. That test is also rendered in 
some cases as one of 'pressing social need' but in essence 
it has two components, that the action is:
(1) in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and
(2) proportionate. 
The legitimate aim is in most cases is self-evident, in theo '
sense of being in pursuit of one of the enumerated 
qualifications or limitations set out in the relevant 
Convention Article.
The concept of proportionality, although understood by 
the domestic courts, has not been widely applied and its 
application under the HRA will result in fundamental 
shifts in thinking, particularly in relation to the notion of 
reasonableness as it is understood by public lawyers.
The need for the domestic courts to consider evidence 
of what is necessary in a democratic society or constitutes 
a pressing social need will require them to balance policy 
and political issues in a way that they have never had to do 
before. This obligation on the judiciary to establish 
objective standards of democratic necessity has been 
described by Sir William Wade as 'the brave new world of 
interpretation that will confront the judiciary' (Wade, 
'Human Rights and the Judiciary' [1998] EHRLR 520) 
and will have major consequences for evidence and 
disclosure.
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM
Hitherto the court has only been required to make 
judicial review decisions on the basis that a public 
authority has acted unlawfully or irrationally. The factual 
evidence has rarely been disputed. In relation to unlawful 
acts, the court's role has been to consider whether the 
public authority acted in contravention of prescribed
rules, having regard to public law doctrines such as 
' o o r
whether the authority exercised its power for a proper 
purpose. Rarely has the court needed to balance closely 
competing arguments.
Similarly, in relation to irrationality, the Wednesbury 
reasonableness test set a high threshold which left little 
margin for closely competing arguments. That test as 
described by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions 
v Minister for the Civil Service ([1985] AC 375) is:
'A decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or 
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had 
applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived 
at it.'
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Where fundamental rights are involved, the court haso '
narrowed the test, applying the test approved in R v
Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith ([1996] QB 517):
'The court may not interfere with the exercise of an administrative 
discretion on substantive grounds save where the court is satisfied 
that the decision is unreasonable in the sense that it is beyond the 
range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker.'
However, balancing closely competing arguments 
remains a novel concept in judicial review and, as Lord 
Ackner commented in R v Secretary oj State for the Home 
Department ex parte Brind ([1991] 1 AC 696 at 762), as 
compared with Wednesbury reasonableness the principle of 
proportionality is 'a different and severer test'.
EXISTING PRACTICE
The absence of any need to balance closely competing 
arguments has shaped the court's attitude to the evidence 
it will hear and its willingness to order disclosure. 
Traditionally, judicial review cases have been heard on the 
basis of affidavit evidence and the claim set out by the 
applicant, and generally the court has been reluctant to 
accept further evidence except where that evidence would 
assist the court:
(1) to understand more clearly the nature of the factual 
material before the body whose decision was being 
challenged;
(2) to determine any matters of facts on which that 
body's jurisdiction depended;
(3) to determine whether that body had complied with 
an essential procedural requirement; or
(4) by establishing proof of any alleged misconduct by 
that body or its members.
Equally, the court has been reluctant to permit cross- 
examination. Although Lord Diplock made clear in 
O'Reilly v Mackman ([1983] 2 AC 237), that cross 
examination was available in judicial review cases and 
'should be allowed whenever the justice of the particular 
case so requires', he went on to make it clear that a public 
authority's finding of fact was not open to review and 
warned against allowing cross examination on the grounds 
that it 'presents the court with the temptation, not always 
easily resisted, to substitute its own view of the facts.'
Similarly, although disclosure is available in judicial 
review cases, it is not an inherent right. The court has 
taken the view that it is appropriate in fewer cases on 
judicial review and therefore its use has generally been 
circumscribed. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v National 
Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Limited 
([1982] AC 617), Lord Scarman said that disclosure in 
judicial review should not be ordered:
'unless and until the court is satisfied that the evidence reveals 
reasonable grounds for believing that there has been a breach of
V
public duty; and it should be limited strictly to documents 
relevant to the issue which emerges from the affidavits.'
This reluctance on the part of the court means that it 
has been rare for disclosure to be secured in judicial 
review cases and in practice it has only been provided 
where the court is convinced that the content of affidavits 
is inaccurate or where the need has been established to 
look behind the affidavits.
THE CHALLENGE AHEAD
The Civil Procedure Rules contain no new rules on 
evidence and disclosure to deal with the developments 
which will take place in judicial review. It is therefore up 
to practitioners and the courts to devise new solutions 
within the existing framework, taking account of the 
concept of proportionality, the obligation on the court as 
a public authority to act consistently with the Convention 
(and, in particular, to respect the Article 6 right to a fair 
trial) and its obligation under section 3 of the HRA to take
' O
account of the case law of the Strasbourg Court. The
o
solutions devised will largely depend upon four factors:
(1) the nature of the factual evidence which is accepted 
by the court;
(2) the scope for third party intervention;
(3) the manner in which Convention rights are pleaded 
and applied; and
(4) the application of the margin of appreciation.
/. Evidence of the facts
The HRA will require courts to adopt a fundamentally 
different approach to evidence, the concept of 
proportionality leading to a more intensive review of the 
facts and the substantive merits of decisions. As a 
consequence respondents will need to adduce evidence of 
the facts which form the basis of their decisions and of the 
decision-making processes which caused them to believe 
their actions were necessary and proportionate. It is likely 
that these considerations will require the court to admit 
evidence of the 'legislative facts' which gave rise to a 
particular policy.
The notion of legislative facts, which go to the basis of 
policy, as opposed to the 'adjudicative facts' which only 
relate to the dispute between the parties, is an American 
jurisprudential concept characterised by the so-called 
'Brandeis brief (named after Oregon's counsel, Louis 
Brandeis, who was later a Supreme Court justice), 
submitted to the United States Supreme Court in Muller v 
Oregon (208 US 412 (1908)), which contained two pages 
of legal argument supported by 100 pages of legislative 
facts, principally socio-economic data. Since then the use 
of Brandeis briefs has been common in proceedings 
before the US Supreme Court (e.g. in the landmark case 
of Brown v Board of Education (347 US 483 (1954), a 29
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Brandeis brief was submitted providing evidence on the 
sociological and psychological effects of racial segregation 
in schools.
In judicial review proceedings the adjudicative facts   
the effect which a particular decision has had on the 
claimant   can be determined from the affidavits. The 
legislative facts   how the decision is justified in public 
policy terms   requires more searching consideration and 
the potential use of Brandeis briefs to provide that 
evidence has not been overlooked by the judiciary. As 
Henry LJ observed in R v Ministry of Defence, ex pane Smith 
([1996] QB517):
'if the Convention were... part of our domestic law, ... the 
court... might well askjbr more material than the adversarial 
system normally provides such as a Brandeis brief.'
2. Third party intervention
In other jurisdictions third parties play an important 
role in judicial review proceedings by providing the courts 
with Brandeis or other amicus briefs and it is likely that 
third party intervention will become an increasingly 
significant part of judicial review proceedings.
The HRA does not provide a general right of third party 
intervention but the Lord Chancellor, during the 
proceedings on the Human Rights Bill, made it clear that 
the expectation was that the practice of non-governmental 
organisations filing amicus briefs would develop and that 
section 7(3) HRA (which establishes the 'victim' test as 
the standing to bring judicial review proceedings) 'would 
not prevent the acceptance by the courts in this country of 
non-governmental organisation briefs.' (Hansard, HL 24 
November 1997, cols. 825-833). Further, Rule 54.17 of 
the Civil Procedure Rules enables the court to permit any 
person to file evidence or make representations at the 
hearing of a judicial review case.
Third party intervention has often proved crucial to 
determining legislative facts before the Strasbourg Court. In 
Young James ^Webster v United Kingdom ((1982) 4 EHRR 38), 
neither the applicants nor the government were willing to 
present arguments that the 'closed shop' was necessary in a 
democratic society and evidence was accepted from the 
Trades Union Congress on that point. Similarly, in Sheffield 
andHorsham v United Kingdom (decision A/946, 30 July 1998), 
liberty was permitted to provide a comparative study on the 
legal recognition of transsexuals in other signatory states.
More recently the House of Lords has shown itself 
willing to accept amicus briefs. In R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department ex parte Thompson and Venables ([1998] AC 
407), the House of Lords accepted written submissions 
from JUSTICE on the requirements imposed on the 
United Kingdom as a signatory to the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, and in R v Bow Street Stipendiary 
Magistrate ex parte Pinochet ([1999] 2 WLR 827), the court 
heard oral submissions from Amnesty International.
The use of third party intervention has also extended to 
judicial review proceedings and In R v Lord Chancellor ex 
parte Witham ([1997] 2 All ER 779), the Public Law 
Project was permitted to submit an affidavit, which read 
more like a Brandeis brief, setting out the circumstances 
in which the voluntary sector had subsidised non-legally 
aided applications to the courts where the applicant could 
not afford to pay the court fees.
3. Applying the Convention
In putting arguments to the court, practitioners need to 
derive the maximum benefit from their interpretation of 
the Convention rights. Simply interpreting the Convention 
as a schedule to a UK statute would result in the loss of 
valuable arguments and it must be recognised that the 
Convention:
  should be given a purposive interpretation;
  is a living document to which the ECHR case law gives 
a contextual interpretation (Tyrer v United Kingdom 
(1978) 2 EHRR 1);
  assumes certain democratic norms, for example a 
pluralistic, tolerant and broadminded society, exists in 
signatory states (Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 
EHRR 737);
  in its application in the United Kingdom, provides an 
opportunity to re-interpret or narrow the Strasbourg 
Court's margin of appreciation.
4. The margin of appreciation
The Strasbourg Court has permitted a wide margin of 
appreciation in its interpretation of the Convention, in 
recognition of the fact that signatory states' governments 
and courts are better able to determine whether specific 
social policy is appropriate for local circumstances. The 
Strasbourg Court has never applied the Convention as a 
human rights 'code', requiring the same uniform solution 
to be adopted by each national authority, but has exercised 
a restrained judicial review, giving due deference to 
domestic authorities within a range or limits set by the 
court against what is proportionate.
In theory the margin of appreciation should not apply 
before the domestic courts but in practice it will not 
disappear altogether, other than in name. This is because 
the domestic courts have always sought to avoid 
substituting their own view for that of a public body whose 
decision has been challenged in judicial review 
proceedings. As Lord Hope of Craighead observed in Rv 
Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte Kebilene ([2000] HRLR 
93):
'..the Convention should be seen as an expression of 
Jundamental principles rather than as a set of mere rules. The 
questions which the courts will have to decide... will involve 
questions of balance between competing interests and issues of
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proportionality. In this area difficult choices may have to be 
made by the executive or legislature between the rights oj 
individuals and the needs of society. In some circumstances it 
will be appropriate Jor the courts to recognise that there is an 
area of judgement within which the judiciary will defer, on 
democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body 
or person whose act or decision is said to be incompatible with 
the Convention...'.
The obligation imposed on the domestic court by the 
HRA to take account of the Strasbourg jurisprudence will 
mean that the margin of appreciation in such case law will 
determine the minimum standard to be applied by the 
domestic court but that court will then be free to refine 
and narrow that case law to meet domestic needs. The 
scope for the court to narrow the case law and fill the void 
left by the margin of appreciation is an opportunity which 
practitioners can exploit and this will be particularly so 
where the case law concerns a decision of the Strasbourg 
Court in relation to a signatory state other than the UK.
CONCLUSION
The Bowman Committee did not recommend changes too
the court rules in relation to judicial review to reflect the 
impact of the HRA on evidence and disclosure. Instead it 
followed the common law tradition of leaving it to
o
practitioners and the courts to devise innovative solutions
to meet the new challenges. It will be up to those involved o r
in judicial review proceedings to persuade the courts to 
seize the opportunities which the HRA provides. @
Jonathan Bracken
LLB (Hons), solicitor. Partner, Bircham Dyson Bell, London. Scholi 
Residence US Law Library of Congress.
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What the US needs is a new electric meter
by Edward L. Flippen
Like Presidents Nixon and Carter before him, President 
George W Bush has developed a national energy policy. 
What is different about President Bush's policy is his 
proposal that the US adopt comprehensive electric 
industry legislation that promotes competition, 
encourages new generation, protects consumers, enhances 
reliability, and promotes renewable energy. In other 
words, he has made a national electricity policy a central 
part of his overall national energy policy.
One need not be a rocket scientist to know that the US 
needs additional power plants to meet increased demand 
during peak periods. If the answer to the increased 
demand is so simple, then why do we continue to 
experience shortages in certain parts of the country? The 
problem with building power plants (besides our 'not in 
my backyard' syndrome) is that additional plants, by 
themselves, are not a cost-effective answer to the 
electricity shortage. Whether in a state that continues 
with traditional rate regulation, or in a state such as 
California that has deregulated power plants, the 
consequence of adding power plants, without addressing 
pricing, will be the same   inefficiencies.i o'
The real cost of power changes continuously throughout 
the day. Yet, with only a few exceptions, customers see 
only a monthly price on their bills. They, therefore, have 
no incentive to reduce their consumption at peak periods, 
and increase consumption in off-peak periods, because 
they do not pay for electricity on an hourly or some other 
interval basis. Under this traditional pricing method, 
building additional power plants will not necessarily 
ensure the availability of adequate electric supplies. The 
added costs of those plants will simply be rolled in with 
the existing cost structures of power suppliers and the 
average costs passed on to consumers in their monthly 
bills. Consumers will continue to demand greater 
amounts of electricity at peak periods, and more plants 
will be built to meet those demands instead of ensuring 
better utilisation from existing plants.
There is no doubt the US needs additional power 
plants. But, perhaps more important, we need a better 
pricing mechanism, such as time of use rates. Notably, 
however, flexibility in pricing is hampered by the limited 
features of the mechanical meters traditionally used by 
utilities to measure customer consumption. Such meters 31
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